This of course is an empirical claim, and it is difficult, simply because of difficulties in the topic of historical explanation, to know how true it is. Did jazz in any sense cause or only emblemize the moral transformations of the Jazz Age? Did the Beatles cause or only prefigure the political perturbations of the Sixties-or had politics simply become a form of art in that period, at least the politics responsive to music, the real political history of the world taking place on a different level of causation? In any case, as we know, even works intended to prick consciousness to political concern have tended by and large to provoke at best an admiration for themselves and a moral self-admiration for those who admired them. The cynical bombing of the Basque village of Guernica on April 26, 1937, made Guernica happen-so it was not merely wit when Picasso responded to the German officer's question, having handed him a postcard of the painting, "Did you do that?" with "No, you did." Everyone knew who did what and why: it was an atrocity meant to be perceived as an atrocity by perpetrators who meant to be perceived as prepared to stop at nothing. The painting was used as a fund-raiser for Spanish war relief, but those who paid money for the privilege of filing past it used it only as a mirror to reflect attitudes already in place, and in later years it required art-historical knowledge to know what was going on: it stood as a handsome back drop for pickups at the Museum of Moder Art, or a place to meet a date, like the clock at the Biltmore Hotel, and it was sufficiently handsome in its grey and black harmonies
[172] ARTHUR C. DANTO to have ornamented the kitchen cupboard in a sophis ticated apartment I once saw written up, where souffles were concocted for bright and brittle guests who, no more than the hostess, realized that gutted animals and screaming mothers agonized above the formica: it was painted at about the same time as Night Fishing at An tibes, after all, as Anita Silvers has observed, and uses the same sorts of forms as that lyrical work. So in the end it did about as much for the ravaged villagers as Auden's poem did for dead Yeats or as Yeats's poem did for his slaughtered patriots, making nothing relevant happen, simply memorializing, enshrining, spiritualizing, consti tuting a kind of cenotaph to house the fading memories, about at the level of a religious ceremony whose function is to confess the extreme limitation of our powers to make anything happen. Hegel places religion just next to art in the final stages of the itinerary of the spirit, where his tory is done with and there is nothing left but to become conscious of what in any case cannot be changed.
Fine. But if the sole political role of poetry is this deflected, consolatory, ceremonial not to say reliquary office, why is it so widely subscribed a political attitude that art is dangerous? The history of art is the history of the suppression of art, itself a kind of futility if that which one seeks to cast in chains has no effectiveness whatever, and one confers upon art the illusion of competence by treating as dangerous what would make nothing happen if it were allowed to be free. Where, if Auden is right, does the belief in the dangerousness of art come from? My own view, which I mean to develop here, is that it does not come from historical knowledge, but rather from a philosophical belief. It is based upon certain theories of art that philosophers have advanced, whatever it may be that caused them in the first place so to have sensed a danger in art that the history of philosophy itself might almost be regarded as a massive collaborative effort to neutralize an activity. Indeed, construing art, as Auden does, as a causally or politically neutered activity is itself an act of neutralization. Representing art as something that in its nature can make nothing happen is not so much a view opposed to the view that art is dangerous: [173] it is a way of responding to the sensed danger of art by treating it metaphysically as though there were nothing to be afraid of. n the first serious philosophical writings on art-per haps the first writings in which art is so much as recognized as such-a kind of warfare between philos ophy and art is declared. Because philosophy itself is a warring discipline, in which philosophy is divided against philosophy with nearly the degree of antagonism we find expressed between philosophy and art in the fateful initiating pages of Platonic aesthetics, it ought to be cause for suspicion that there is a near unanimity on the part of philosophers of art that art makes nothing happen: for on what else do we agree? Even so engaged a writer as Sartre thought of art, hence thought of his own practice as a novelist in the fiction in which he sets forth this view, as lying outside the order of existential contingencies: a shelter against mutability. Plato notoriously identified the practice of art with the creation of appearances of appear ances, twice removed from the reality philosophy address es. It is striking that Sartre, like Keats, like Yeats, puts artistic reality exactly where Plato put philosophical reality, but this interchange leaves the topology unal tered, and we may remark anticipatorily at this point that the charge that philosophy makes nothing happen is not unfamiliar. In any case, both philosophy and art, on the Platonic scheme, contrast with the kind of practical knowl philosophy just is impatient science. Caught in the dilem ma of being either pseudo science or proto-science, philos ophy thus reenacts the dilemma Plato set for art. And perhaps if we could liberate philosophy from these toils we might find no better place to begin than liberating art from them, and by emanicipating art from its philos ophy we might emancipate philosophy from its own paral lel philosophy: the liberation of the oppressed being, by a familiar liberationist formula, the liberation of the oppres sor as well. In any case there must be something deeply common to two enterprises which seem subject to a com mon dissolution, especially when this form of dissolution has no obvious application elsewhere, unless (of course) to religion. system-so though they approach the issue from opposite directions, the implication in both is that art is a kind of ontological vacation place from our defining concerns as human, and with respect to which accordingly "makes nothing happen." This is reenforced in Kant when he speaks of art in terms of "purposiveness without any speci fic purpose." The work of art looks as though it ought to be useful for something, but in philosophical truth it is not, and its logical purposelessness connects with the dis interests of its audience, since any use it might be put to would be a misuse, or a perversion. So art is systematically neutered, removed from the domain of use on one side (a good thing if artists lack practical intelligence they merely can give the appearance of having) and, on the other side, from the world of needs and interests. Its worth consists in its worthlessness, which you may recall is also Plato's cari cature of the thought that justice is a skill.
Schopenhauer had a considerably higher regard for art than any Plato shows in his philosophy, but in an impor tant sense he agrees with his great predecessors that art makes nothing happen in the causal order of the world. Its importance rather consists in its power to lift us out of that order and to put us in a state of contemplation of eternal things. There is a characteristically bad inference that contemplation of the timeless is itself timeless, which then provides a lever for hoisting us, in fulfillment of a Yeatsian wish, outside the order of time and suffering. We must appreciate that simply to exist in the causal stream is, on Schopenhauer's view, to suffer, since suffering is the defining trait of worldly existence. But then, one might parenthetically observe, one must distinguish between the sort of suffering of which the standard human condi tion simply consists, and that sort of suffering which oc curs, say, to persecuted Jews, which Auden laments the incapacity of his poetry to mitigate. It certainly would have been a bitter counsel to suggest to the skeletal suf ferers of Dachau that life is suffering, though the con templation of art helps. As Auden once wrote on the par ticular issue of Third World hunger: "It's heartless to forget about / The underdeveloped countries, / But a starving ear is as deaf as a suburban optimist's." But I am less concerned to deal with the after all cheerful pessi mism old Schopenhauer stood for than in stressing that his continuity with Kant is locating art at right angles to the world as will.
Kant did suppose art should give pleasure, but it will have to be a disinterested pleasure, hence a tepid grati fication since unconnected with the satisfaction of real needs or the achievement of real goals. So it is a kind of narcoleptic pleasure, the pleasure which consists in the absence of pain, which is just Schopenhauer's thought that the value of art must lie in the freedom it promises from topical urgencies in real life. Nevertheless, disin terested pleasure, with its implied contrast with the prac philosophy is afraid of? Perhaps the fear is that if the enemy is illusory, philosophy is illusory, since its prime objective has been to slay what only seems a dragon! Indeed, it has at times struck me that the conventional division between the fine and the practical arts-between les beaux arts and les arts pratiques-serves, in the name of a kind of exaltation, to segregate les beaux arts from life in a manner curiously parallel to the way in which calling women the fair sex is an institutional way of putting women at an aesthetic distance-on a kind of moral pedes tal which extrudes a woman from a world it is hoped she has no longer any business in. The power to classify is the power to dominate, and these parallel aestheticizations must be regarded as essentially political responses to what were sensed as dark dangers in both (see Germaine Greer). Aesthetics is an eighteenth-century invention, but it is exactly as political, and for the same causes, as Plato's was of setting artists at a distance which aesthetic distance is a refined metaphor for. It was a bold and finally successful strategy, leaving serious artists to suppose it their task to make beauty. So the metaphysical pedestal upon which art gets put-consider the museum as laby rinth-is political translocation as savage as that which turned women into ladies, placing them in parlors doing things that seemed like purposive labor without specific purpose: embroidery, watercolor, knitting; essentially friv olous beings, there for an oppressor's pleasure disguised as disinterested. Small wonder that Barnett Newman should have written (1948): "The impulse of modem art was this desire to destroy beauty ... by completely deny ing that art has any concern with the problem of beauty." Small wonder that Duchamp should have said, regarding his most famous work, "The danger to be avoided lies in aesthetic delectation!" I owe to Duchamp the thought that, from the perspec tive of art, aesthetics is a danger, since from the perspec tive of philosophy art is a danger and aesthetics the agency for dealing with it. But then what should art be if it throws [181] off the bondage to prettiness? It is not enough to be self assertively ugly, though this is a tactic a good bit of recent art has sought to employ. Uglification is too negative a stance, and finally futile since being ugly remains a way of being an aesthetic object and hence underscores bond age instead of overthrowing it. It is like the self-defemini zation of women, casting frills to the flames. The way to stop being a sexual object is not to become an anti-sexual object, since one remains an object through that trans formation when the problem is how to slip objecthood al together. I mean, of course, aesthetic objecthood, and to change one way of appearing for another remains an acquiescence in the view that one's essence is one's appearance. So some deeper transformation is required, one to which surfaces, lovely or awful, are irrelevant or of equal access to all johns was a major factor, it will be remembered, in the defeat of the ERA.) They are, more over, given the cultural realities, objects associated with privacy (though less so than stools) and with dirt. But any object that lies at the intersection of sex and secretion is too obviously charged by the moral boundaries it pre supposes simply to stand as a culturally neutral object picked out just for its aesthetic neutrality. Duchamp was being disingenuous when he asked: "A urinal-who would be interested in that?" It would be like taking the filthiest verb in the language as one's paradigm for teach ing conjugation: possibly the word's moral energy will go submerged as one ponders it from the perspective of gerunds and pluperfects, but why struggle when there are plenty of innocent words? It is, meanwhile, ingenu ous to treat the urinal merely as an aesthetic object, rather like the Taj For Hegel, the world in its historical dimension is the dialectical revelation of consciousness to itself. In his curi ous idiom, the end of history comes when spirit achieves awareness of its identity as spirit, not, that is to say, alienated from itself by ignorance of its proper nature, but united to itself through itself: by recognizing that it is in this one instance of the same substance as its object, since consciousness of consciousness is consciousness. In the portentous jargon of the Continent, the subject/object dualism is overcome. Quite apart from such reservations as one must justifiably hold regarding this overcoming, let alone the celebration of it as the end of history, it is worth observing that certain stages in this history are specially marked, art being one stage and philosophy another, and it is the historical mission of art to make philosophy possible, after which art will have no historical mission in the great cosmo-historical sweep. Hegels stu pendous philosophical vision of history gets, or almost gets,. an astounding confirmation in Duchamp's work, which raises the question of the philosophical nature of art from within art, implying that art already is philosophy in a vivid form, and has now discharged its spiritual mission by revealing the philosophical essence at its heart. The task may now be handed over to philosophy proper, which is equipped to cope with its own nature directly and de
finitively. So what art finally will have achieved as its fulfillment and fruition is the philosophy of art. But this is a cosmic way of achieving the second stage of the Platonic program, which has always been to substitute philosophy for art. And to dignify art, patronizingly, as philosophy in one of its self-alienated forms, thirsting for
[184] ARTHUR C. DANTO clarity as to its own nature as all of us thirst for clarity as to our own. Perhaps there is something to this. When art in ternalizes its own history, when it becomes self-conscious of its history as it has come to be in our time, so that its consciousness of its history forms part of its nature, it is perhaps unavoidable that it should turn into philosophy at last. And when it does so, well, in an important sense, art comes to an end.
I cannot trace in this paper the structure of such a possi ble history (but see my essay 'The End of Art"). My main concern has been to put into perspective the somewhat shabby history of the philosophy of art as a massive politi cal effort either to emasculate or to supersede art. And to sketch certain of the strategies in this long unedifying career. It is always a question in psychotherapy whether the knowledge of the history of a symptom will constitute a cure or merely a kind of acquiescence. Our pathologies may after all, as Freud perhaps realistically affirmed, be the Kern unser Wesens, and in the present case art may by now have been so penetrated by its philosophy that we cannot sunder the two in order to rescue art from the con flicts aesthetics has trapped it in.
But in revenge, philosophy has itself become entrapped in its own strategems. If art makes nothing happen and art is but a disguised form of philosophy, philosophy makes nothing happen either. Of course this was Hegel's view. "When philosophy paints its grey in grey," he wrote in one of the most melancholy phrases a philosopher might read, "then has a form of life grown old." Philos ophy makes its appearance just when it is too late for anything but understanding. So if, according to a ringing slogan, since hardened into a radical cliche of Marxism, we want to change rather than understand the world, philosophy cannot be of use. When, then, self-conscious ness comes to history, it is by definition too late for some thing to be made in consequence to happen. So the philos ophy of historical being which holds art to be a transform of philosophy shows philosophy to be a transform of art, and this is the great irony of Hegel's theory: the second part of the Platonic attack reduces to the first part of the Platonic attack, and philosophy, having set itself against art, sets itself finally against itself. This would give us a
[185] GRAND STREET kind of explanation of the fact that the same structure of argument philosophy mounted at the beginning against art should have returned to call the enterprise of philoso phy into question in our own time. So there is an incentive in philosophically curing art of philosophy: we by just that procedure cure philosophy of a paralysis that it began its long history by infecting its great enemy with.
Perhaps, for the moment, this is enough by way of speculative philosophy of history. Still, it would be un seemly not to press a bit further, for if neither of the philosophical reasons for pretending that art can make nothing happen are compelling, the fact remains that the history of art is the history of censorship, and it would be interesting to inquire what sort of thing it is that art can make happen, which is of a kind to be regarded dangerous enough to merit, if not suppression, then political control. So I will try to end on a somewhat positive note regarding the powers of art.
he first observation to make, admittedly a quite un exciting one, is that once we have separated art from the philosophical theories that have given it its character, the question of whether art makes anything happen is not any longer a philosophically very interesting question. It is, rather, a fairly empirical question, a matter for history or psychology or some social science or other to determine. There are theories of history, Marxism being a good ex ample, in which art is excluded from the deep deter minants of historical change, since it merely reflects or expresses such changes: it belongs in the superstructure rather than the base of a historical process which moves on two levels, only one of which is effective. Philosophy too has at times been placed in the passive superstructural position by Marxism, a self-neutralizing transposition if Marxism itself is philosophy and means to change the world: a dilemma neatly sidestepped by Marxists treating Marxism as a science, and as in the famous linguistics con troversy in the Soviet Union, placing science in the dynam ic base. A deeper incoherence, it seems to me, is to be found in the repression of certain forms of art, which is after all a benchmark of communist governments which happen also to subscribe to the tenets of historical mate [187] say that politics makes nothing happen. But once we sanely cede power to politics, it becomes difficult to know where the line is to be drawn, and why art should in the end be uniquely ineffectual and merely reflective.
Once we return to surface history-or once we return surface history to historical effectiveness-it seems simply a matter of fact whether poetry makes anything happen. It would be futile to suppose that poetry readings should have saved the Jews. There are times when the sword is mightier than the pen. But it would only have been against some current of extravagant and immoderate ex pectations that one could have believed that poetry should have saved the Jews or that folksongs should have saved the whales. Hamlet, for example, believed art could be effective in his own war with Claudius, and he was right, in a way. He was right, however, not because the play within the play was art, but that as art, it was able to communicate as Hamlet perhaps lacked the courage to communicate directly, that Claudius's crime was known to a consciousness other than Claudius's: for how was Claudius otherwise to explain the choice of a drama in any terms other than that Hamlet knew, and meant for Claudius to know that he knew the bloody truth, and that he had chosen The Murder of Gonzago with the intention of conveying this fact? So the play was, metaphorically, a mirror for Claudius, but not for anyone else in the audi ence, save irrelevantly: and yet it was as much art to them for whom it was not a mirror as to him for whom it was.
They were shocked or bored or even amused, and as a gen eral theory of art and its efficacy Hamlet's theory is a bad one. It is bad as would be a theory that poetry is code when in fact someone writes an anagrammatic poem by means of which the instructed reader can get the formula of the atomic bomb: the little melody in The Lady Vanishes encodes some important secret, but its being a folksong has nothing to do with the special uses it might have been put to.
Perhaps what it is unexciting to observe is all there is to observe, though the example just canvassed has the danger of suggesting that art makes something happen only adventitiously, when it is put to an extra-artistic use: and that leaves the familiar thought that intrinsically it makes [188] nothing happen as art. And we are back in the first form of the Platonic attack. There must be something wrong with this if I have been at all right in my arguments of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace that the structure of artworks is of a piece with the structure of rhetoric, and that it is the office of rhetoric to modify the minds and then the actions of men and women by co-opting their feelings. There are feelings and feelings, on the other hand, some issuing in one kind of action and some in another, and poetry may make something happen if it is successful in promoting action of a sort that may make something happen. And it cannot be extrinsic to the art work that it should do this if indeed the structure of the work of art and the structure of rhetoric are of a piece. So there is reason after all to be afraid of art.
I am not sure that the structure of rhetoric and the structure of philosophy are of a piece, since it is the aim of philosophy to prove rather than merely persuade: but the common structures of rhetoric and art go some dis tance toward explaining why Plato might have taken a common posture of hostility towards them both, and why aesthetic Socratism should have seemed so congenial an option. And who knows but that the analogy between art works and females is due to a reduction of the latter to feeling in contrast with reason, presumed to be masculine? So that Plato's program of making women the same as men is another aspect of his program of making art the same as philosophy? In any case it has been a long and fateful disenfranchisement, and it will be a task to disassemble portions of the philosophy of art from art: all the more timely since there has been a recent effort to deconstruct philosophy by treating it as though it were art!
